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PRESERVING HISTORY IN ACCOUNTING:
SEEKING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN 'NEW' AND 'OLD' HISTORY
Abstract
Traditional conceptions of accounting history and its
achievements are being challenged by new accounting
historians who are informed by radical philosophies and
approaches to history. This is a belated reflection of
movements within the wider discipline ofhistory which can be
traced to the Annalists in the 1930's and more recently to the
influence of postmodemism. At issue between the traditional
and new history are the importance of facts and the pursuit of
truth by traditional historians. New accounting historians have
decried the reactionary effects of traditional history, which
they propose to overcome by substituting accounting as an
interested discourse for accounting as a neutral, socially sterile
technique. As the conventional form of history writing, the
narrative form also has been disparaged. The paper concludes
by warning that accounting historians should avoid the
extreme path of the postmodemist historians. They should
instead be tolerant of different approaches to accounting
history.
•
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PRESERVING HISTORY IN ACCOUNTING:
SEEKING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN 'NEW' AND 'OLD' HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the 'alternative' research or critical accounting paradigm in accounting and
its strong challenge to the entrenched hegemony of the positivist paradigm is one of
the most striking features of academic accounting over the past decade. Central to
much ofthe critical accounting research which has sought to question the legitimacy of
existing institutions, distributions ofpower and the role of accounting in sustaining and
perpetuating dominant capitalist forms of discourse has been an emphasis on history.
Work which incorporates insights from the work of Foucault, for example, in order to
explain and critique the present relies heavily upon developing a historical trajectory
(eg Stewart 1992; Armstong 1991; Hoskin and Maeve 1986; Loft 1986). Indeed, much
of the work in the alternative paradigm stands or falls on the strength of its historical
work; that which is now boastfully referred to as the "new accounting history" (for
examples see Willmott 1986; Walker 1991; Bryer 1991; Loft 1986, pp.140,167).
The embracing objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly, to show some of the
fundamental differences between traditional1 and new accounting historians, initially
through an examination ofconflicts in the wider discipline of history, and then to argue
that, in the absence of an extremist interpretation of the mission of accounting history,
there can be sufficient common ground to bind the accounting history discipline. To
achieve these objectives the paper will update some of the judgements in Miller,
Hopper and Laughlin's 1991 paper which reviewed the progress of new accounting
history and examine the criticisms levelled by the new accounting history at traditional
or 'old' forms of accounting history, especially beliefs about the relationship between
facts and truth, objectivity and the place of narrative in the writing of history. With
reference to the work ofPaul Ricoeur the paper promotes the role of narrativity in the
IHoskin and Maeve prefer the tcnn "conventional" (1986, p.IO?) while Loft, with deliberation,
describes traditional accounting history as "official history' (1986, p.140) .
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'new' accounting history, arguing that narrative should be central to the subject matter
and epistemology ofnew accounting history and not be treated as incompatible.
This paper, therefore, is both an attempt to demonstrate the value of the methods of
the "old" accounting history and a plea for understanding between the new and the
traditional historians. It will argue, after Miller, Hopper and Laughlin (1991,
pp.398,399), that both streams of accounting history have much to gain by seeing
some value in the contributions which the other can make and much to loose if new
accounting historians take the path of intellectual superiority which seeks to demean
the accomplishments and methods of traditional accounting history. Identification of
faults should not mean that the whole structure is condemned. The last thing which
accounting historians should do is extend the battles of the wider accounting discipline
into accounting history. The schism in accounting research between positivists and the
non-positivists has been the cause of enough angst and ill feeling in the discipline,
especially as the positivists are seen as using their current ascendant position to
advantage like minded and motivated colleagues.
Reflecting the nature of the new research agendas within the alternative research
paradigm (sometimes called critical social research), accounting history has embarked
upon a path which is at variance with traditional conceptions of accounting history.
Consistent with the radical philosophy, methods and aims of alternative research, the
differences between the new accounting history and traditional accounting history are
exalted as the saviour of accounting history and the means by which it can start to
make a worthwhile contribution to improving our understanding of the environment in
which accounting operates. More importantly, new accounting history is said to
provide the foundation to expose the reflexive relationship between accounting and the
socio/economic/political system in which it is embedded and thereby demonstrate that
not only do "men make history ... (but) history also makes men and fashions their
destiny - anonymous history, working in the depths and most often in silence" (Braudel
1980, p.10; Loft 1986, p.138).
~ .J
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Researchers in accounting have been reminded that to "the extent that the social
construction of reality is generally a long-term, gradual process, the research strategy
should also focus on building a knowledge of context" (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988,
p.548; Dillard 1991, p.9). Similar calls much earlier by Littleton (1933, p.267) and
later by Glautier (1973, p.437) indicate that the current interest of new accounting
historians is far from novel in accounting history. What is new is the difference in
purpose of the new accounting historians' focus. For Littleton a study of the social
context of accounting was important to see how society's needs led to accounting
practices. The new accounting history's concern is significantly different in primary
focus. To promote their endeavours the new accounting historians see the study of
accounting history
as a way of demonstrating that the legitimacy of a particular body of
professional knowledge, its status as a naturalized and neutralized body
oftechniques, is a historically contingent state of affairs (Miller, Hopper
and Laughlin 1991, p.395).
Cooper and Sherer stress that a strong reliance on a descriptive historical approach to
the study of accounting is necessary "in order to understand the changing roles of
accounting" (1984, p.219). In a similar vein, Hopwood and Johnson have praised the
emphasis ofmany accounting historians on
taking temporal sequences seriously when attempting to understand the
emergence of outcomes and events. They strive to ask questions of
social structures and processes when they are understood to be situated
concretely in time and space (1986, pp.38-39, quoted in Poullaos, 1992,
chapter 2).
Numerous other studies have also referred to the "web of social factors" in which the
meanings of accounting have been embedded and the way that these have been
"seriously underresearched" (Laughlin 1990, pp.16,34,35; Neimark and Tinker 1986;
Burchell, Clubb and Hopwood 1985; Miller and O'Leary 1987; Kirkham 1992).
History in its traditional forms has been widely criticised by those within the academic
accounting profession and by professional historians. Mills (1993, p.801) refers to 20
years of turmoil in the discipline of history which has been brought about as historians
have borrowed from a wide diversity of social sciences (see also Braudel 1980, p.200).
i1 _
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These borrowings have brought the content and methods of traditional history, which
have developed since the 19th century (Carr 1964; Elton 1982; Parker 1990, p.l), into
open and often acrimonious conflict with the brash ways of the 'new' historian
(Braudel 1980, p.6; Himmelfarb 1987,1994). Prominent amongst the torrent of
criticism which has been levelled at the way history has been traditionally practised and
written have been American historiographers, notably Hayden White. Despite often
vitriolic attacks by this group, well known practising historians still have a very firm
and fond attachment to traditional conceptions of history and the way it should be
written and researched (Himmelfarb 1987,1994; Tuchman 1981; Elton 1982).
Certainly, in this regard, accounting historians continue to be prominent examples. As
a result of the reluctance of many 'traditional' historians to launch their craft on the
new wave of history, two antagonist camps have developed: those who see very little
of merit in the traditional history and want to sweep it away in the rush to their new
order, amongst which appear to Tyson (1993,1995) to be the new accounting
historians, and those who dedicate themselves to preserving the place of traditional
history.
In the next section the paper examines, with reference to the battles raging in the
discipline of history, the main features of the new accounting history and its criticisms
of traditional accounting history. These concern ontological and epistemological
disagreements which have lead the new accounting historians to reject, to varying
degrees, the traditional concerns, although not necessarily the methods, of history
practice. This paper regards the differences between the new and the traditional
accounting history as another variation of the disagreements between historiographers,
and others practising in the wider discipline of history, which have been passionately
argued over this century without any final resolution. The paper later focuses on the
antipathy of new accounting history towards the narrative form of history. Without
underestimating the differences between new and traditional accounting history, the
paper argues for a less extreme position than is sometimes advocated and proposes
that the narrative as a means of story-telling can be a starting point for understanding
and tolerance within the discipline of accounting history. Certainly if accounting
historians take up the cudgel's of historians outside accounting and attempt to
j
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perpetuate their inconclusive conflicts it is unlikely that accounting historians will be
successful where so many others have failed. Should new accounting historians adopt a
more moderate approach and not seek to take all before them then accounting history
is in a strong position to accomplish a great deal.
OLD HISTORY, OLD ACCOUNTING HISTORY AND THE THREAT OF
THE NEW
It is not difficult to find in the accounting and history literature a large number of good
reasons for studying history, most of which praise its usefulness. A fond hope, which
even a cursory study ofhistory shows is rarely honoured, is that as a result of the study
ofthe past we will have a better understanding ofhuman nature which will enable us to
be tolerant and to avoid the mistakes of the past, thereby giving us greater control over
the present (Russell 1957, p.25; Willis 1987, p.123). For Huizinga history is "the
intellectual form in which a civilisation renders account to itself of its past" (Zagorin
1990, p.273; see also Pirenne in Marwick 1981, p.287). G.M. Trevelyan, the
archetypal traditional historian, believed that history would make people better citizens
and allowed people to live richer lives by opening new intellectual and spiritual vistas
(Cannadine 1993, p.184). Bertrand Russell also saw history as suggesting "possibilities
ofaction and feeling which would not have occurred to an uninstructed mind" (quoted
in Willis 1987, p.123).
In the case of accounting history, Napier (1989), Johnson and Kaplan (1987), Ezzamel
et al (1990), Previts et al (1990) and Murphy (1950, p.280) follow their history
colleagues and accord utilitarian motives to the study and writing of accounting
history. Previts et al (1990), for example, propose that it assists accounting policy
makers and standard setters and informs accountants of their heritage, especially
interdisciplinary contributions to the evolution of accounting. Johnson and Kaplan's
Relevance Lost (1987) has been a particularly recent prominent example of the
importance now accorded to the study of accounting history. Common to each of the
views expressed above is the belief that history should inform the present by
illuminating the path to the present ie. announce the underlying forces and influences
which produced the historical positions (Previtts et al 1990, p.3; Lee 1990, p.lOO;
Arrington and Francis 1989; Ezzamel et al 1990, p.157; Carlyle in Parker 1990, p.6
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and also see p.224). This alone, apart from the inherent pleasure of reading and writing
accounting history, notes Napier (1989, p.239), would justify the place of accounting
history. No longer should accounting historians feel that they have to defend the value
ofaccounting history.
Disputes over the type of history which should be the work of the historian have
occupied historians particularly since the tum of the century, waxing and waning
through a number of phases. The current rivalry between the new and the old history
(not the new and old accounting history) can be traced to France in 1929 with the
publication ofAnnales d'Histoire: Economique et Sociale by Lucien Febvre and Marc
Bloch and around the same time in England the Economic History Review. These
events. notes Stone (1981, p.l l ), marked the start of an internecine war which has
only deepened since 1960 with the rise of new strands of history, including geographic
history, c1iometry, feminist history and the many derivatives of ethnocentric history
(see also Himmelfarb 1989, pp.661,664 and 1994; Appleby et al 1994; Stoianovich
1976). Appleby et al (1994. pp.199,200) characterise the form of history which arose
in the 1960's to challenge traditional history as new social history. These historians did
not reject the methods of traditional history, only its conclusions by redirecting
emphasis from the political and economic to the social ie. recognising the existence of
social classes other than political and economic elites. To highlight the alleged myopia
of traditional history, Ermarth (1992, p.17) rhetorically asks the telling question "Is it
possible to exist outside history? Women know; they have existed there" (see also
Lehman 1992; Kirkham 1992).
The nascent criticisms of these new social historians were seized upon by a more
extreme group of historians, referred to now as postmodernists/, which had far more
fundamental disagreements with traditional history. They questioned not only subject
matter but also the accepted beliefs about truth in history writing, the existence and
duplicity of 'facts' and the stability of the language of history (Appleby et aI 1994,
pp.200-1). At the present time accounting history is going through a similar sequence
: Sec Ennarth (1992. ppA.5) and Calhoun (1993) for a brief history of the development of
postmodcrnism and its guiding principles.
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of development, except that the stages have been compressed and to some extent
overlap in the new accounting history with the presence of an amalgam of diverse
styles of history ranging from what will be referred to as new social accounting
historians pursuing 'contextualised history' (Napier 1989, p.244; Hopwood 1983;
Willmott 1986, p.559; Hopper and Armstrong 1991) and accounting historians moving
towards postmodern conceptions of history (see Tyson's 1993 and 1995 complaints).
In the case of the former, a more tolerant stance is usually taken on the practices of
traditional history with most criticism reserved for its asocial nature. For a postmodern
accounting historian, everything about traditional accounting history would be open to
questioning.
The big differences between traditional and postmodern historians are to do with their
contrasting stands on subjectivity, realism and conceptions of time. Once it is agreed
that there is an objective, knowable reality outside the historian then facts immediately
assume an important role in the discourse of history. If instead, as the postmodernists
advocate, history is rendered by highly subjective interpretations which do not accept a
separate reality; that language is not a simple signifier of this external reality and that
time is rhythmic instead of chronological, then facts are dethroned and the evidence of
history becomes just another form of text (see Calhoun 1993, p.80). Although these
changes to traditional understandings of history mean that there is no longer a unified
field ofhistory, recent research makes it very clear that there is still the opportunity for
all but the more radical new social accounting historians to find common ground with
the traditional accounting historians. Should the time ever arrive, reaching an
accommodation with postmodern accounting historians will be much more difficult, as
this paper will show, because of their different conceptions of historical facts, historical
time and reality.
The work of accounting historians generally has been slow to reflect these
controversies in the wider discipline of history. Journals promoting a new accounting
history did not start to appear in any number until the 1980's and it was not until this
time that the bastion of traditional accounting history, the Accounting Historians
Journal, signalled its intention to move from highly descriptive forms of history. Even
i1 _
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now, many accounting history researchers seem to be either unaware of or to have
underestimated the yawning divide which separates traditional and postmodern
conceptions of history and which threatens to cast accounting history into similar
turmoil. Napier (1989, p.244), for example, while he distinguishes between traditional
accounting history and contextualised accounting history, apparently accepts a change
in focus from accounting as a technique to accounting as a constituent and active
element in social and organisational contexts as the salient (only) difference between
the two without pursuing the implications of this for the practice of history. He seems
to conclude that all forms of history can peacefully co-exist, the one working with and
extending the efforts ofthe other:
(t)he ... (contextualising) approach does provide a theoretical structure
within which accounting history may be written, but it is not clear whether
this structure will prove liberating or ultimately constricting. The actual
content of the historical contextualisers' research programme could well be
quite similar to that of the traditional school, as many issues are seen as
problematic by both approaches (1989, p.25).
His approach is naive and misleading to readers of accounting history for it understates
the radical agenda ofpostmodem historians.
Accounting history recently has moved from a prolonged period where practitioners
felt secure in the solid contributions which they were making to the understanding of
accounting to a new period ofuncertainty about the legitimate directions and concerns
ofaccounting history. Miller, Hopper and Laughlin (1991) propose that recent changes
in accounting history constitute more than enough reason to refer to a 'new accounting
history', an echo of Braudel's observation that "(i)t is a new world, so why not a new
history" (1980, p.8). They argue that changes in methodologies, subject matter and a
keener awareness of the constitutive role played by language have empowered
accounting history for the first time. In their view the changes have taken accounting
history from a protracted state of obsequious submission and naivety to the threshold
of maturity. Unfortunately, designating these changes to the practice and writing of
accounting history as 'the new' inescapably generates apprehension on the part of
those who represent the previously accepted forms of accounting history.
Consequently, traditional accounting historians have taken the announcement of the
}
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coming of the new accounting history as a declaration that they can expect trouble,
with the result that many of the defenders have retreated to the barricades to resist the
intruder. Currently foremost amongst the defenders of the place of traditional history in
accounting is Tyson (1990,1993,1995) while Tinker et al (1988), Hopwood (1983),
Hoskin and Maeve (1986) and Armstrong (1987) are strong champions of the new
accounting history.
So successful have been the new accounting historians in promoting their cause,
principally through vigorous research, that traditional accounting history has been
spurred into denunciations of their energetic and persuasive rival (Tyson 1993,1995).
Tyson sees conventional accounting historiography as being "besieged" by the new
accounting historians (1995, p.17). This is taken as a compliment by the new
accounting historians, a signal of "impressive achievement" (Armstrong 1991, p.2).
Instead of the two groups of historians inciting attacks upon each other a more
tempered approach and productive stand should concede that there can co-exist
several, non-mutually exclusive streams of accounting history where each can learn
from the achievements and criticisms of the other. The progress of one should not be
at the fatal expense of the other. In this regard. Braudel has argued that
we can no longer believe in the explanation of history in terms of this or
that dominant factor. There is no unilateral history. No one thing is
exclusively dominant ...(1980, p.l O; see also Lee 1990, pp.99-101 and
Ermarth 1992, p.14).
The two rocks upon which any co-operative endeavour between the traditional and the
new accounting historians can flounder are what appear to be wildly differing
perceptions about content and methods as well as divergent ontological and
epistemological beliefs. Himmelfarb contends that, the disagreements between the 'old
guard' and the new are so profound that the two approaches constitute "different
conceptions of history" (1987, p.5). Despite this pessimistic outlook adopted by some
historians, this paper will instead argue that traditional accounting historians can safely
'give' without undermining their credibility or relevance and that the new accounting
historians can continue to incorporate most of the methods of their predecessors
without diluting the strength and integrity of their critique. Simpson (1988 in Stewart
1992, p.69) has sought to recommend this direction for accounting history by pointing-
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out that "stringent scepticism about the nature of historical claims can perfectly co-
exist with an absolute commitmentto historical methods".
To see the source of the differences between the traditional and the new historians one
does not have to go any further than their respective positions on the 'facts' of history.
From these stem most other differences.
TRADITIONAL HISTORY: A HISTORY OF FACTS OR ONLY TEXT?
Traditional history has been characterised as obsessively empirical with an
overwhelming concern for the 'facts' (Breisach 1987, p.138; Bermejo- Barrera 1993,
p.17). Norman (in Miller, Hopper and Laughlin 1991, p.400) refers to this as "history
realism" while Fernand Braudel and the Annalists, after Francois Simiand, called
traditional history "l'histoire evenementielle" or history concerned with events which
had a very limited duration in comparison to the wider sweeps of natural history
(Braudel 1980, p.3; Flynn 1987, p.178; Ricoeur 1980b, p.8). Using language which
can only guarantee to raise the ire of accounting historians who still see the precepts of
traditional history as worthwhile, the new accounting historians have referred to their
predecessor's preoccupation with hard facts as "brute antiquarianism" while their own
newer version is said to lead to "richer histories" which will allow accounting to be
seen as far more than a mere technology (Stewart 1992, p.68; Dillard 1991, p.24;
Armstrong 1991). This one sided view of traditional accounting history which is
reluctant to point to any of its saving graces is common with most new prophets who
believe that to make way for the new the old must be debunked.
Traditional history stands or falls on the veridicality of its facts. It has been the
traditional historian's role to seek out the facts of history from hard evidence,
principally the extant documents of a period, which for the accounting historian most
often have been preserved ledgers, and to let the story of history emerge from those
facts. The traditional historian accepted that there lay within the documented facts a
discoverable truth (see Martin 1993; Ricoeur 1980b, p.8; Napier 1989, p.239). For
Tuchman (1981) discovering this truth and the serendipity which surrounds findings in
historical investigation are the most exciting aspects of the practice of traditional
-
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history. Only 'rough hypotheses' will guide the historian (Hexter 1971, p.18). By not
having any set, preconceived ideas of either specific questions to be pursued or
expected findings, the historian is able to be surprised by that which emerges from the
previously silent historical record:
if the historian will submit himself to his material instead of trying to
impose himself 011 his material, then the material will ultimately speak to
him and supply the answers (Tuchman 1981, p.23).
Without agreement on many basic facts or occurrences in history, according to
traditional historians. there can be no history. Traditional historians do not claim
always to agree on the relative importance of facts or their interpretation; they do,
however, agree on the reality of the past and therefore on the relevance of facts
(Himmelfarb 1989, p.665). If facts, all facts, are taken as contentious, not simply the
information which they embody but because it is disputed that there can be such a
thing as a 'fact', then from the very outset there is little opportunity for co-operation
between new and traditional historians.
Denial of the possibility of objective historical facts is an extreme position usually
associated with postmodem historians which, despite Tyson's (1993;1995, p.18)
accusations, has not as yet taken root in new accounting history (as examples see
Walker 1991; Bryer 1991; Bougen et al 1990; Hoskin and Maeve 1986; Hopper and
Armstrong 19913) . Indeed, there is overwhelming respect for the conventional facts of
history, if not for their meaning in different discursive contexts. For the postmodem
historian there is no such thing as absolute, naive truth. Truth is not something which
lies dormant in the historical record until the attention of the historian brings it to life.
Rather, postmodem history characterises, after Derrida's deconstructionist polemic,
what the traditional historian sees as facts as merely another form of 'text'. Text, as a
unique semantical arrangement of language, is a human artefact and therefore it is an
interested product or, as Ermarth (1992, p.ll) describes it, a form of "discursive
engagement" which is far from neutral. Its meaning will be shaped by the discourse in
which it is embedded (Ermarth 1992, pA). Text is produced for reasons which
3 Hopperand Armstrong. as an example. whenquestioning the historical interpretations of Johnson
and Kaplanstate "The factscertainly bear a different interpretation" (1991,p.414). Theyuse the same
"facts" as Johnsonand Kaplanbut produce a differentstory.
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historians must later attempt to discern by trying to put themselves into the mind of the
historical actors and construct "readable inventions". The act of reading a text is "to
interpret and to interpret is to reinvent, or coinvent, the text" (Ermarth 1992, p.23).
Inventions are deemed to be possible because the language of which text is composed
is notoriously inefficient at communicating a specific, non-ambiguous message. No
matter how hard the writer may strive it is most improbable that language will be
uncontentious, as the wealth of lawyers testifies. Thus, to deconstruct text ie. destroy
factuality, requires the historian to sever the link between text and historical context.
History is then no longer historicised. Instead, a 'constructive suspicion' allows history
to be freed from the constraints of its origins and to take on meanings which transcend
place and time.
The extreme deconstructionist enterprise is to dismantle the privileged interpretations
encoded in all text or 'facts' and thereby dethrone privileged meanings. This allows
other meanings the opportunity to recast the interpretations of history. New meanings
are supposed to become articulated with a naive text which frees the historian from the
accepted and the unquestioned ofthe past.
To those who criticise facts as the building blocks of history, the indeterminacy of
language means that it has no immutable external referents; language is not an
isomorphic mapping of reality. Rather, the messages and meanings which language
conveys have the ability to create differing realities according to how the text is
decoded. Deconstructionists propose that each person's interaction with the text can
lead to a different interpretation. Therefore, there cannot be only one code. Any
meanings attributed to the writer of the text accordingly must compete with those of
later readers. Proximity to the creation of the text does not entitle privilege, according
to the postmodern historian. As a result, textualising historical facts removes any
hierarchical ordering which may have existed in the different branches of history. With
every interpretation of text as legitimate as any other and every text seen as nothing
more than text, or an assemblage of words, there will be no privileging and therefore
no fall back into the pit of factual history. Symptomatic of the changed status of facts
in postmodern history, its followers, argues Himmelfarb, are prepared to venture into
I
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unknown territory where documentary evidence may be scarce, as in pshychohistory
(1987. p.200), and to be directed by 'hypotheses' which channel, even unavoidably
blinker. the historian' s search. The emphasis then tums to interpretation and analysis.
With facts suspect, the primary vehicle of historical writing, the narrative, is also
prepared to be jettisoned by new historians as an unsound derivative of a deceptive
historical culture. To move forward history must leave the narrative behind.
The deconstructionist program is anathema to traditional historians. Where the term
<fact' as used by traditional historians has strong positive connotations. the term 'text'
is laced with negativity. To regard hallowed facts as mere text is to move history from
the rock of certainty to the shifting sands of endless, confusing conjecture. With
nothing stable little can be achieved in constructing the past because there would be no
fixed reality (Himmelfarb 1989. p.666). Traditional historians, amongst whom are
included accounting historians. are not opposed to interpretation but they do assume
that it will be tethered in its wanderings to a spike of facts (Napier 1989, p.241). Their
recognition that competing interpretations are possible, indeed desirable, reflects their
belief that their rendering of facts of the past may be faulty. Given the distance in time
between historians and the objects of their study and the imponderables of humankind's
perfidious nature. complete certainty is not possible.
Recent studies in new accounting history have demonstrated that the process of
deconstucting accounting history does not have to be an all consuming project.
Instead. it recognises that some 'facts' are more open to being disabused of their
Olympian standing while others are permitted to stand (Bryer 1991; Hopper and
Armstrong 1991; Hoskin and Maeve 1986,1988; Loft 1986; Wilmott 1986; Lehman
1992). The new accounting history, therefore, has been relatively cautious in its
denunciations of the accomplishments and methods of traditional accounting history
(for example Miller, Hopper and Laughlin 1990). Despite Tyson's (1990;1993;1995,
p.18) aggressive criticisms, the new accounting history is not as yet some wayward
postmodem history libertine which has come to wreak improvident havoc. The
different frameworks of interpretation used by new accounting historians has not
meant a complete repudiation of the conventions of traditional history. Unfortunately,
4 As a particularly prominent example of doubtsabout the sufficiencyof document preservationin the
historyof accounting see the work of Fleischmanet al (1994) which draws upon the Boulton-Watt
archives in Birmingham. Effortsby famouswriters to recaste their past by destroyingcorrespondence
and requesting their correspondents to follow suit are well known. Charles Dickens, for example, soon
after separating with his wifeburnt all copiesof his letters (Ackroyd 1991,pp.930-1).
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on the past experience in the history discipline this does not mean that the future will
be as equally measured. Questioning of the status quo often brings out more extreme
forms of behaviour and it becomes no longer enough to seek a new king but to do
away with kings altogether. Herein lies a very opportune warning for the new
accounting history.
In addition to criticising the traditional historian's preeminent concern for digging up
the facts of history, however defined, new historians also take objection to the
selectivity which they say must occur during this process and for what they allege has
been the dishonesty of traditional historians in disguising this selectivity. Allowing for
their scepticism of facts, new historians point out that the act of choosing facts from a
vast universe of candidates causes traditional history to be partial and biased and thus
not worth the effort. Lucien Febvre claimed that "(t)here was no history; there are only
historians" (Ricoeur 1980b, p.9). The result, according to Levi-Strauss, was that
"history ... replaced mythology and fulfils the same function" (Ermarth 1992, p.25). In
their defence, traditional historians point out that selecting facts is not the same thing
as 'selectively choosing' items which can support a hypothesis which the historian may
have developed, or ignoring confounding evidence (Zagorin 1990, p.272).
Opponents of traditional history argue that the process of selection means that the facts
selected are not value free, both because a selection process by historical actors has
preceded the historian and the evidence has passed through the historian's cognitive
sieves to determine its significance and relevance. Accordingly, the facts chosen may
be more a reflection of the historian's selectivity than the already unavoidable
selectivity of the past which has bequeathed to historians only part of the enacted past.
Traditional historians, including accounting historians, do not dispute that the historian
is usually dealing with only that part of the past which historical actors determined was
worthwhile preserving and the part of this material which has survived the ravages of
time", In the case of accounting, the preservation of documents recorded on portable,
i
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fragile mediums has been especially fickle and ruthless (Yamey 1981). Bryer in his
work on the accounting practices of Ll.K. railways in the 1840's during the 'railway
mania' was very conscious of the incomplete nature of the records available to latter-
day historians and the possibility of bias which gaps in the record may engender in any
conclusions (1991, p.462).
The best chance of survival for accounting records was to be bound and placed in the
protection of perpetual corporations, trade guilds, ecclesiastical bodies and large
landed estates. Consequently, much of what the traditional historian has worked with
has been that which actors of the past have decided would be available. Given the
undisputed widespread oppression and illiteracy of populations of the past, in most
cases it could be expected that this would be material which more often would favour
the interests of controlling elites and therefore, according to new historians, should be
seen as prejudiced, partial and unreliable (for examples see Winjum 1971; Thrupp
1949; Read 1956; Pollard 1972; Oschinsky 1971; Le Strange 1917; Denholm-Young
1933). Instead of blaming silences in the accounting history record on a form of
unseeing and depersonalised time, Bryer dares to suggest that in some circumstances
there may have been a deliberate and extended attempt to sanitise the historical record
through the destruction and culling of documents by decendents of ruling elites (1991,
p.462).
That part of the past which has gone unrecorded is silenced forever; it is as if it never
existed. Thus, apart from the recorded deeds of the heroic and ruling elites the
remainder of society was given little or no visibility. It becomes the historian's task to
construct the 'original' with very imperfect tools. Historians recognise that in these
circumstances they cannot hope to come up with a result which claims to be the
absolute truth. The best the historian can hope for is to provide an account which in
the face of competing explanations, that could be drawn from the same set of facts,
his/her account is the more convincing or the most likely to be true (Martin 1993,
p.29). Traditional historians have been trained to believe that it is the historian's
obligation
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to discover the truth as best he can, to convey the truth as truthfully as he
can, in order to make the truth known and to enable man ... to distinguish
the right from the wrong reason (Himmelfarb 1987, p.21).
Postmodernists insist that the concept of absolute truth which traditional history
promotes has been an effective means of perpetuating the status quo throughout
historical eras. Truth is characterised as a "totalizing", "hegemonic", "logocentric" and
"tyrannical" concept used by dominant elites for the purpose of maintaining their
position (Himmelfarb 1994, p.83). The new historians argue that truth can only ever be
contingent and partial. Foucault in his Power and Knowledge refers to a political
economy of truth which is "centred on the form of scientific discourse and the
institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political
incitement" through the exercise of power (quoted in Appleby et al 1994, p.203; Loft
1986, p.140). For Foucault history was not to provide the comfort of the old Whig
historians who believed that, despite the woes of daily life, history shows a pattern of
improvement: the travails of the world are not for nothing. Instead, Foucault saw
history as the means to disturb "what was previously considered immobile; ...
(fragment) what was thought unified" (Appleby et al 1994, p.21O). A high priest of the
new historians, HaydenWhite'', made it clear that the new history was less concerned
with ascertaining what happened in the past and more with
the desire to determine what certain events might mean for a given group,
society, or culture's conception of its present tasks and future prospects
(quoted in Stewart 1992, p.61).
To counter the new historian's criticisms that traditional history is tainted by blind,
uninformed empiricism, traditional history disparages what it sees as the relativism of
its rival and, in its more extreme forms, its disdain for truth (Himmelfarb 1994, p.141;
see also Calhourn 1993, pp.76-77). Allegations of the relativisation of truth by new
historians, and the implications which this has for the recognition of 'facts', is probably
the greatest stumbling block which keeps the old and the new apart. Consistent with
their veneration of the facts of history, for traditional historians there must be a belief
in a discoverable truth which can only be uncovered by respect for the facts of history
5 Hisbook. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 191hCentury Europe (Baltimore 1973) has
been influential in promoting the causeof the newhistorians.
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and an honest rendition of these in writing. Cannon (1980, p.14) argues that a
"passionate devotion to historical truth" is one of the "supreme historical virtues". If
historians deny the fundamental presence of truth then
progress in our philosophical understanding ofhow we both do and should
determine what happened, why it happened, and what it means that it
happened may be a long time coming (Martin 1993, p.30).
In the absence of the values of traditional history and the aggressive way postmodem
historians attack its basic beliefs, traditional historians see no future or role for history
(Zagorin 1990, p.274; Himmelfarb 1989, p.667-8; Carr 1964; Tyson 1993,1995;
Ennarth 1992, p.7). For these writers the disagreements between the traditional and
the new and the stated intentions of people like Foucault to dismantle traditional
history (see Stewart 1992, p.65), and traditional history's attachment to a search for
truth, if not the truth, are matters of life and death for their discipline. In Tyson and
Himmelfarb's cases this accounts for the urgency of their message and the passion of
their writing. At best, according to Tyson, the new accounting historians are naive
because ofa lack real world experience. At worst, they are devious charlatans who are
prepared to suppress primary material and to conspire with their colleagues to promote
their dangerous form ofaccounting history (1995, p.29).
Appeals to the truth component of traditional history have encouraged new historians
to take exception to what they see as the high moral tone of traditional historians and
accuse them of hypocritically portraying their history as objective, that the facts which
they recount correspond with a reality in the past instead of being a representation of
the historian's interpretation of what might have happened (Miller, Hopper and
Laughlin 1991, p.396). This characterisation of the practice of history, argue
traditional historians, is not only an exaggeration designed to serve the purposes of the
new historians but also betrays ignorance of the practice of history and the traditional
historian's respect for interpretation (Elton 1982, p.70).
THE ROLE OF INTERPRETATION IN HISTORY
If historians stopped with the collection of facts then they would be dealing in mere
chronologies and antiquarianism. The imagination and creativeness, not in the
20
pejorative sense, of the historian must be brought to bear on the raw material to
produce a written or recorded history (Cannadine 1993, p.185). The past is the past
and we will never be able to reproduce its image either definitely or incontrovertibly.
Contrary to the general impression which new historians try to create, traditional
historians accept that the facts do not speak for themselves but instead the stories
which might be locked within can only be freed as the historian interrogates the raw
material. Traditional historians do not claim that this is a passive process with the
historian maintaining a sterile part in the process, devoid of analysis and interpretation.
Traditional historians have not claimed to write a completely impartial history which is
unaffected by the beliefs and feelings of the historian (Cannon 1980, p.7; Elton 1982,
p.131). Instead, according to Carr, interpretation is "the life-blood of history" where
"the historian is engaged in a continuous process of moulding his facts to his
interpretation and his interpretation to his facts" (1964, p.28,29).
Tyson (1995) is disturbed by what he sees as the new accounting historians' apparent
disdain for historical facts in favour of interpretation, instead of accepting both as
necessary; a view echoed by Zagorin (1990, p.274) and Gourvish (1995, p.12). He
takes particular objection with Miller, Hopper and Laughlin's observation that "there
may be more emphasis on interpretations being tested by facts instead ofbeing derived
from them" (emphasis added) (1991, p.397). Therefore, he urges conventional
accounting historians to be ever vigilant and to "confront every attack that is made
against the relevance of primary evidence" (1995, p.29). Taking the work of Ezzamel
and Hoskin and Maeve on the Springfield Armoury, Tyson (1990,1993,1995) accuses
the new accounting historians of replacing the hard work of mining documentary
evidence with the armchair ease of spurious interpretations, bolstered by dubious
secondary sources, which are designed to further the cause of prominent social
ideologues, in this case Foucault. The consequence is that accounting historians risk
making the facts 'fit' the theory. Echoing the protests of traditional mainstream
historians, Tyson (1995) and Gourvish (1995, pp.l0-11) call for history to be driven by
the facts of history, although even this has its hazards, and not by partisan doctrine;
history which is evidence driven and not theory driven. Despite Tyson's good
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intentions. he is confusing 'theories' with the frameworks of interpretation which the
new accounting historians bring to their work.
Some traditional historians regard the intrusion of the personality of the historian as a
strength and urge the historian not to be ashamed to admit that there is a subjective
component to hislher work. Rather, good history writing requires the facts to be
worked with imagination (Clark 1967, p.44). This is not a call for licence in history.
Indeed. it is well recognised that it is dangerous to play with the facts and that "all
interpretation ... is speculative" (Clark 1967. p.45). Carr (1964) argues that there has
always been for the historian this 'quarrelsome dichotomy' between facts and
interpretation which causes historians to question just how far they should intrude
themselves into their story. The trick has been to strike a balance between
interpretation ie. the historian's personal contribution to history, and the facts of the
past so as to reduce the distortions which will ultimately result when the past is
reflected from the historian. This should not entitle critics of traditional modes of
accounting history to conclude, argues Mills (1993, p.802) and Tyson (1995), that
because complete objectivity cannot be ensured that the historian should give up all
attempts at achieving a measure of objectivity. Nor should they feel entitled to
substitute a declaration of their personal beliefs and apprehended biases, the
implication being that this is the practice of new accounting historians, as if this could
compensate for an acceptance that the historical enterprise as traditionally interpreted
is worthless without complete objectivity.
Differing conceptions between traditional and new historians on the importance of
interpretation and the reliability of the facts ofhistory can be seen to be related to their
conceptions of reality. For the traditional historian there is a reality outside of the
observer which can be gauged and described, however imperfectly; hence the superior
standing offacts. For a postmodernist there is no objective reality of the past; reality is
instead a discourse amongst others which historians create through language and
which should not be privileged (Appleby et al 1994, pp.250-1 and White 1989, p.245).
In this view there is no separate otherness which is superior to the reader oftext and to
which the text points. Reality is nothing other than a construct of the reader and
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therefore has no inherent, stable form (Ermarth 1992, pp.69,164). The implication of
this is the rejection of the traditional historian's conception of change and the
uniqueness of historical events, which are the manifestation of change, as particular
(idiographic) and non recurrent (Stone 1981, p.4; Himmelfarb 1987, p.156; Robinson
1904 in Breisach 1987, p.143; Dauenbauer 1987, p.167). New history instead is
nomothetic. It turns away from historicism, challenges the uniqueness of historical
events and seeks similar patterns and, more importantly, enduring meanings
throughout history.
REALITY, THE NEW ACCOUNTING HISTORY AND LIBERATION FROM
THE PAST
Reliance on a realist form of history and exposure to its alleged deficiencies, it is
alleged, has blinded traditional accounting history to discourses of power. This has
caused it to be naive in its economic assumptions, including those pertaining to the
motives of economic actors, narrow in the compass of its subject matter and
complicitous in sustaining hegemonic relations of power (Armstrong 1991, p.2; Mills
1993, p.802). This view can be seen to be reinforced with reference to the definition of
accounting history given by the American Accounting Association's (AAA) Committee
on Accounting History as "the study of the evolution in accounting thought, practices
and institutions in response to changes in the environment and societal needs" (1970,
p.53). Instead of this guileless, instrumentalist view of accounting, new accounting
historians accuse accounting of being "infused with interests, such that its very nature
is constructed by the exercise of social and political power" (Tinker et al 1988, p.128;
Lee 1990, pp.99-100). Consequently, accounting is not an ideologically sterile
technology (Laughlin and Lowe 1990, p.16; Laughlin 1987, pA80; MacIntosh and
Scapens 1990, p.468; Chua 1986; Hopwood 1987, p.213). Traditional accounting
history is mocked for allegedly missing all of this through its single minded dedication
to ordained facts and its supposed aversion to interpretation.
Adherents of the new accounting history believe the first step in enlightenment requires
that we should not seek clues in current accounting practices which might indicate
their original purposes. They stress that it is improbable that roles fulfilled by powerful
technologies, such as accounting, which are implicated in the establishment and
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perpetuation of a given set of power relations will have remained unchanged over
hundreds ofyears. The present, therefore, is not the undistorted image of the past. We
are urged instead to look beyond that which confronts us now and to not let the aura
of the known present occlude the opportunity to be open to the hidden realities of the
past.
Whereas the traditional accounting history adopted an instrumentalist, functionalist
view and was preoccupied with a continuous incline of evolution in accounting
technologies, double entry bookkeeping in particular (Littleton and Yamey 1956;
Littleton 1966; Yamey 1947,1964; Kats 1924,1926; de Roover 1955,1956; Winjum
1970; Lee 1990, p.99), the new accounting history has a much broader agenda
(Bougen et al 1990; Loft 1986, p.140). The new accounting historians take particular
issue with the conception of accounting development as being one of continuous
improvement in response to the needs of capitalism. This approach to accounting
history followed the well-worn path of Whig history where the selection of facts and
the direction of the historical narrative were governed by the need to show that history
is the story of progress (Bertrand Russell in Willis 1987, p.123; Marwick 1981, p.286;
Parker 1990, p.9). Instead of a trajectory of continuous improvement, Foucault argues
that history is characterised by unevenness and discontinuity. History is not
deterministic. Rather, there is considerable opportunity for human agency to intervene
and tum back on itself any emerging trend in history. The present does not have to be
better than the past.
The more aggressive new accounting historians seek to liberate us from the tyranny of
our unquestioned past, which they see has been the legacy of traditional accounting
history, to reveal the true nature of our existence (Dillard 1991, p.17; Dauenhauer
1987. p.vii). The ability to reflect on the past, according to Aaron, was seen by Hegel
as the source ofknowing for
man has in fact no past unless he is conscious of having one, for only such
consciousness makes dialogue and choice possible. Without it, individuals
and societies merely embody a past of which they are ignorant and to
which they are passively subject (quoted in Dupre 1987, p.24).
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New accounting historiansargue that uncritical acceptance of the social, economic and
political frameworks in which accounting developed meant that capitalist discourses
were privileged at the expense of others and that the objectivity of accounting was a
constructed illusion (Hopper and Armstrong 1991). Essential to this process has been
the absorption of accounting as part of the accepted order of things, thereby making
accounting's powerful influence over capitalist discourses virtually invisible to
traditional accounting history (see Roberts 1991, pp.355,359). Dillard urges that unless
accounting historians embrace alternative ideologies to those which have dominated
accounting history research in the past then "accounting will continue to reinforce and
reify the social system from which it emanated" (1991, p.9). Accounting history by
conceiving accounting solely as a technology divorced it from its social context and
thereby allowed connections between the two to go undiscovered. By restoring
accounting to its social contexts, ie. to show how it influenced its social context,
thereby to give it meaning, the present can be liberated from the possessive grip of a
sanctioned, unchallenged past (Stewart 1992; Hopwood 1983). This "true history",
according to Ricoeur, is the means by which the "buried potentialities of the present"
become accessible (1981, p.295).
New historians argue that before historians can begin to ask and then to answer
significant questions about the past as it has lead to the present they must be aware of
the need to ask questions. Therefore, the first task of the historian is to raise the
consciousness of the observer; to part the veil of deceptive experience, to question
comfortable conventions by "telling what was the case" (Megill 1989, p.647). Fay's
. self estrangement theory' determines that most people are unaware of the
dichotomous existence they experience, with "human existence ... split into two
spheres, the manifest/ordinary and the hidden! extraordinary" (quoted in Dillard 1991,
p.IS). The former is seen and sensed. The 'hidden' consists of those belief systems,
conventions, social structures and practices which by their ancestry and diffusion
remain unchallenged. These constitute the substance of a discourse. Discourses
provide the means to construct a persuasive reality through their unobtrusive abilityto
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define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not possible to
say (and by extension- what it is possible to do and not to do) with respect
to the area of concern of that institution ... A discourse provides a set of
possible statements about a given area, and organises and gives structure
to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked
about. In that it provides descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions
of social and individual actions (Kress 1985, pp.6-7 in Yeatman 1990,
p.I64).
The new accounting history desires to raise the level of consciousness; to enlighten by
providing alternative explanations for the observable and accepted which 'simple'
historical investigation has encouraged. From a radical structuralist point of view,
accounting can be implicated with power and privilege which arise from these
exploitative, hidden structures contained within the discourses which accounting
facilitates (Dillard 1991, p.14; Walker 1991, p.279). In terms of Morgan's schema of
11 major metaphors relevant to accounting, "accounting as politics" and "accounting
as mythology" are most relevant to the new accounting historians (1988, pA81). In the
first instance, accounting and accounting systems are seen to "reflect and support the
values and needs of specific interest groups" (pA81). As mythology, "accounting
systems provide a societal resource to be used in sustaining myths of rationality, and as
a means ofjustifying rationalizing, and legitimisingdecisions that ultimately serve other
individual and social ends" (pA81).
With the benefit of hindsight, new accounting historians attempt to attribute to the
actors of the past the 'real' motives which guided their actions and not what the raw
documentary evidence seems to suggest. In contrast, understanding accounting history
within its social context for traditional historians has been interpreted as placing
themselves back in time, trying to get into the heads of people at the time and see how
accounting was used from their perspective and not one borrowed from the present
time. The present should be understood in light of the past, certainly never the past in
terms ofwhat is known of the present (Russell 1957, p.l0; Tuchman 1981, p.18; Elton
1982, p.65; Napier 1989, p.241) for
(t)he study of the past with one eye ... upon the present is the source of all
sins and sophistries in history '" It is the essence of what we mean by the
word 'unhistorical' (Carr 1964, pAl).
•
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According to Hopper and Armstrong this form of sophistry has marred Johnson and
Kaplan's transaction cost approach to management accounting history (Hopper and
Armstrong 1991, pA09).
It took skill on the historian's part in selecting and organising historical material but
also imagination to be able to create in the historian's mind the conditions of the time.
The traditional historian does not claim to know the motives of people of the past
better than they did themselves; he/she only attempts to recreate these motives from
the fragmentary evidence available (see comments by Himmelfarb 1994, p.133).
New historians paternalistically claim to be more knowing than those locked in their
historical context and who were unable, therefore, to stand outside of their
surroundings, shake off the ideologies and beliefs which governed their life and to see
how they were controlled. The new historians believe that they are able to bring to the
study of the past an understanding of what was really happening. To the traditional
historian this is arrogance of the highest order, apart from being just plain bad history.
Himmelfarb (1989, p.668) sees it as condescending and demeaning to ignore that
which historical actors believed about their lives. Himmelfarb (1989) and Appleby et al
(1994, pp.S, 226) argue that, taken to extremes, the new history results in the rewriting
of all history, transforming it in the image of the present and not, as historians have
previously accomplished, in terms of the past as the past knew itself:
the old history stands within the received opinion, trying to understand
it as contemporaries did, to find out why they believed what they did,
why those beliefs seemed to them "credible", a " faithful interpretation
of their experiences (Himmelfarb 1989, p.669).
To expose the ideology of traditional history and the hegemonic interests it has served
requires the new historians to attack not only traditional methods of historical research
but also the vehicles used to communicate the results of historical research
(Himmelfarb 1994, p.137). In particular, the narrative form of historical discourse has
attracted the approbation of new historians. Hopper and Armstrong, for example,
criticise traditional management accounting histories for being "rich in narrative terms
but they have neglected to explore the important linkages between phases of
accounting development and their socio-economic context" (1991, pAOS). Applebyet
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aI (1994, p.231) believe that the word narrative "has become one of the charged code
words of the current struggles over history". In the next section it will be argued that
rejection of narrative in accounting history is unnecessary because, apart from possible
extreme examples of postmodem accounting history, both new and traditional
accounting history can, and do, accommodate narrative. Disagreements over the reality
of facts, objectivity and the nature of truth in history do not preclude a narrative form
to written history. Thus, the narrative can provide the common ground between new
and old accounting history.
ASSAULTS ON THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE IN HISTORY
The significant ontological and epistemological disagreements between new and old
historians cause the role of narrative in the writing and telling of history to be
contentious. In terms of the historiographical approaches described by Stone (1979),
Megill (1989) and Porter (1981)
(n)arrative is taken to mean the organisation of material in a
chronologically sequential order and focussing of the content into a
single coherent story, albeit with sub-plots (Stone 1979, p.3).
Porter believes that "traditional historical narratives are the most effective way to
express our understanding of temporal events" (1981, p.ix). They allow the
confirmation of "an entire discourse, one that values empirical procedure, reasoned
discovery, problem solution, linear causality and temporal unfolding" (Ermarth 1992,
p.19). Polkinghome favours the narrative for the way it orders individual events,
thereby making them
comprehensible by identifying the whole to which they contribute. The
ordering process operates by linking diverse happenings along a temporal
dimension and by identifying the effect one event has on another, and it
serves to cohere human actions and the events that affect human life into a
temporary gestalt (1988, p18, quoted in Poullaos 1992, chapter 2).
For traditional historians the narrative is fundamental not only to the organisation of
historical events but to their conception ofhistory (see Elton 1969; Appleby et al 1994,
pp.231,235; Himmelfarb 1994, p.36). According to Tuchman, narrative "is the
lifeblood of history", "the most desirable thing a writer can do" (1981, pp.18,48).
Ricoeur has argued for "the irreducibly narrative character of history" (1981, p.275)
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while for Groce "where there is no narrative, there is no history" (quoted in White
1989, p.3). Although White has established his reputation on criticism of the traditional
history he could still accept narrative as "a manner of speaking as universal as language
itself' (White 1989, p.l).
Narrative has been the preferred and natural form of historical discourse for historians
since the time of the ancients, receiving the imprimatur of history luminaries like
Homer, Trevelyan, Gibbon and Macaulay (eg. Gibbon 1984, p.158). The traditional
historian's preoccupation with facts and evidentiary precepts inexorably lead to the
narrative. It is only in this century that historical narratives have fallen into disfavour in
the face ofaggressive, universalist and, what Burke calls, scientific historiographies of
the new history (1991, pp.14,15). In addition, the privileging of these 'scientific' paths
to history caused a narrowing of historical perspective resulting in, laments Hamerow
(1989), exclusion of historical writing's traditional audience of amateur enthusiasts
through its arcane statistical and theoretical discourses.
Until this century it has been difficult for historians to conceive of any mode of
historical discourse other than the narrative because the quest for historical truth and
the narrative have been inexorably woven. Narrative was not solely a means of
chronologically ordering the melee of the past, rather the past was a narrative; it
unfolded as a narrative with events occurring at specific instances of time with
beginnings and conclusions, causes and effects (see Reisch 1991, p.2; Megill 1989,
p.645; Parker 1990, p.6). The narrative has been accepted as the natural form of
history and of everyday life as it progresses through events from morning (opening) to
evening (close). The naturality and cornrnon-placeness of the narrative, those very
aspects which have attracted generations of traditional historians, however, have been
contributing reasons for making it suspect and leading to its denunciation by new
historians. According to White,
a discipline that produces narrative accounts of its subject matter as an end
in itself seems methodologically unsound; one that investigates its date in
the interest of telling a story about them appears theoretically deficient
(1989,p.l).
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Sentiments of this force have not received the unquestioned allegiance of all new
historians. Recently Norman (1991, p.119) has called upon new historians to re-
examine their hostility towards narrative and to recognise that it can have relevance.
Narratives can be examined on two levels: as a technique of writing, a form of story-
telling, and as an epistemological form. When postmodernists, for example Foucault,
criticise history and new accounting historians criticise traditional accounting history
they are mainly concerned at the level of epistemology (Appleby et al 1994), although
censure of the narrative has also embraced its story telling function (Megill 1989,
p.638). For Barthes the sequential structure of the narrative was the source of
considerable historical violation because it suggested
that the mainspring of narrative is precisely the confusion of consecution
and consequence, what comes after being read in narrative as what is
caused by: in which case narrative would be a systematic application of the
logical fallacy denounced by Scholasticism in the formula post hoc, ergo
propter hoc (quoted in Megill 1989, p.639).
In his defence of the narrative in history, the French advocate Paul Ricoeur (1985)
treats narratives as a form of story telling with the corresponding structure of a story.
The story, and therefore the narrative, can either be historical narrative or a form of
mythical narrative, described by Scholes and Kellog as the "empirical narrative" and
the "fictional narrative" respectively (Ricoeur 1981, p.288). It is not the form of the
story which separates the two forms of narrative but the content. In the former, as this
paper has shown above, facts gleaned from documents and aspirations to truth drive
the story. In the fictional narrative, the form of narrative which some new historians
would ascribe to all narratives, imagination is the motive force; there is no expectation
of truth in the sense of correspondence to some external referent. It is common for
new historians to find the story-telling nature of historical narrative repugnant because
they see it as description laden and story-telling as synonymous with, and carrying the
negative connotations of, 'telling stories'.
The chronological sequencing required by the narrative IS problematical for
postmodern historians also because it depends on linear historical time where historical
events are strung along time, one leading to but not necessarily causing the others
b
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which are subsequent. Narrative time assumes the guise of a neutral tool having no
impact on the events which it orders. Time is treated as unidimentional and
unidirected. Thus, instead of narrative time accommodating events, events have to be
structured to fit with historical time. As a result some of the dimensions of the past are
excluded from written history. To reinstate these, Ermarth has suggested the concept
of 'rhythmic time' (Ermarth 1992, p.16). Rhythmic time is the time of the human pulse
or the duration ofan aroma. It
recalls readers to their senses by focusing acts of attention of the actual
practices of consciousness and sensibility as they operate in process, and
not as they might operate if the world were ... a rational, natural,
logocentric place (Ermarth 1992, p.12).
As an alternative to the historical time of the traditional narrative, rhythmic time
removes the interconnectedness of temporal moments in history and instead
accentuates the importance of each (Ermarth 1992, p.53). Time becomes no longer
directed.
New historians refer to 'narrative' in a generic sense; they do not see that there can be
different forms ofnarrative which perform different functions. Topolski (1990, p.326),
however, distinguishes structural narratives, which recount the details of social life,
from dynamic narratives which move through an extended course of events. He also
describes a narrative continuum, extending narratives from those which are primarily
works of description to those which give greater emphasis to explanation. Apart from
the end points which serve only a referential or terminal role, at each point along this
scale, which can encompass all history, narrative will be infused with elements of both
description and explanation (see comments of Previts et al 1990, p.2; Megill 1989,
p.650). After all, historians do not
simply... explain, as some contend. On the contrary, they first of all
recount, in delight or fascination or horror or resignation. Upon
recountings (descriptions), explanations arise (Megill 1989, p.653).
Accusations ofbeing overly concerned with description have been particularly effective
in calling into question the role of the narrative in history. It is also castigated for
imposing a narrative structure on a "pre-narrativized past" which leads, in White's
terms, to "interpretative violence" (White 1989, p.3). Further, narratives are said
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artificially to choose enclosure and commencement and configure facts into an
inappropriate unity (Norman 1991, p.120; Veyne in Megill 1989, p.630). One of
Satre's characters in La Nausee pessimistically concludes that "to present human life in
the form ofa narrative is always to falsify it" (quoted in Norman 1991, p.120).
Irrespective of the type of narrative, they all have the common characteristics of a
beginning after which changes occur which elicit reactions from the actors and lead to
conclusions as the actors attempt to resolve problems which are not usually of their
own doing (Ricoeur 1980a, p.174; Dauenbauer 1987, p.165). Narrative
has its own dialectic that makes it pass through the successive stages of
mimesis, starting from the prefigurations inherent in the order of action,
by way of constitutive configuration of emplottment ... to the
refigurations that arise due to the collision of the world of the text with
the life-world (Dauenbauer 1987, p.l67).
It is not changes per se which demand a response from the unsuspecting actors but the
revelation of previously hidden dimensions which change brings about (Ricoeur 1981,
p.277). Actors are therefore caught in a web of causation and reaction which they seek
to manage. The narrative 'configures' or organises these actions and reactions into
understandable wholes. The narrative is not the story but the mechanism which holds
the whole together; it is the form rather than the substance of the story. As actors react
to their changed circumstances the story is irresistibly moved forward. Thus,
to follow a story is to understand the successive actions, thoughts and
feelings as displaying a particular directedness. ... (W)e are pushed along
by the development and ". we respond to this thrust with expectations
concerning the outcome and culmination of the process (Ricoeur 1981,
p.277).
The actors' reactions energise the story both by their ex post nature and the set of
expectations which the actors' behaviours create about how the story will conclude.
Although the direction of the narrative is ascertainable, it is not possible to deduce the
conclusions from the narrated events. There is no sense of inevitability, only
conclusions which can be regarded as "acceptable" in light of the events (Ricoeur
1981, p.277). History is not, and cannot be, prophetic (BraudeI1980, p.9).
L..
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In a narrative it is the presence of a plot which enables historical events to cohere into
a meaningful and understandable chronological arrangement by eliciting "a pattern
from a succession" of events (Ricoeur 1980a, pp.171, 178; see also Previts et al 1990,
p.2). Unless an event contributes to the development of a plot, according to Ricoeur, it
will not be historical (1981, p.277). The importance accorded to plot in traditional
historical narrative, however, cannot be tolerated by postmodern historians. The very
existence of a plot would indicate that one interpretation of historical events is being
naturalised and privileged above others. The interested role of narrative leads the
postmodem historian to be suspicious of plots as understood in the sense of 'to
conspire secretly'. Thus, not only does there not have to be a 'story' with a plot to
give form and a meaning to events, the need for meaning is also rejected. Ermarth
notes how this creates great consternation to traditional historians for
if one conceives of narrative ... in terms of unified temporal sequences of
action- sequences that can be formulated in terms of cause and
consequence- the absence of such sequences and powers is tantamount to
the absence ofmotivation itself, or even worse, a symptom of authorial self
display and self-indulgence(1992, p.21).
Many of the differences between the new and traditional historians on the nature and
role of narrative in the writing of history or, as the new historians would argue, the
construction ofhistory, centre on the new historians characterisation of narrative as an
interested discourse. In this view narrative, like accounting, is not a neutral tool of
history used to represent but instead has been used to "constitute a spectacle" (Barthes
as quoted in White 1989, p.19). Ermarth believes that it is hard to overestimate the
impact of narrative time on "individual subjectivity, ... proper uses oflanguage ... and,
perhaps most of all, the nature and uses of knowledge" (1992, p.20). Adding
considerable support to this view, White (1989, p.19) sees narrative as a form of
multilayered code which is meant to convey messages, only some ofwhich are sensible
to the target audience. The new history seeks firstly to decode the narrative and
expose what may have been previously undetected messages. Narrative, therefore, can
be seen as either a communicative discourse, a means to get a message across but
where the meaning can be lost in the content of the message, or a performance
discourse designed to produce meaning or configure attitudes. As a configurative
discourse narrative is not a form of construction but an ideology reliant upon language
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to achieve its aims. If the form of the discourse is changed from the narrative then the
messages obtained from the discourse will differ (White 1989, pp.14,19).
The constitutive or configurative dimension of a narrative complements the
chronological episodic dimension which is implicated in the narrative's communicative
discourse (Ricoeur 1980a, p.178). The former, according to Ricoeur, is what is
overlooked by anti-narrativists in their enthusiasm to denounce the narrative. As a
result the narrative is divested of
complexity and above all of its power to combine sequences and
configurations. Indeed, this structure is so paradoxical that every narrative
can be conceived in terms of the competition between its episodic
dimension and its configurational dimension, between sequence and figure.
This complex structure implies that the most humble narrative is always
more than a chronological series of events and, in turn, that the
configurational dimension cannot eclipse the episodic dimension without
abolishing the narrative structure itself (Ricoeur 1981, p.279).
Unlike the chronological dimension in the historical narrative, which is a discovered
entity, the configurational dimension arises from reflection by the writer. In this regard
it resembles the creativity and subjectivity which the new historians argue is a fatal flaw
of traditional history. There exists, therefore,
a dilemma about the historical narrative; as historical it claims to represent,
through its from, part of the real complexity of the past, but as narrative it
is a product of imaginative construction, which cannot defend its claim to
truth by any accepted procedure of argument or authentication (Mink,
quoted in Norman 1991, p.119).
We have seen in this paper that this has not been a significant problem for traditional
historians who have recognised the need to incorporate creativity and exactitude in
writing history.
If new accounting historians continue to recognise the elemental role of narrative in
their histories, at least its configurative dimensions, then there can be considerable
common ground upon which they can co-operate with their more traditional
colleagues. The large number and diverse range of new accounting histories are
compelling recommendations that narratives can accommodate the critiques of new
accounting historians and the results of traditional accounting history research
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(Burchell et al 1985; Bryer 1991; Armstrong 1987; Hoskin and Maeve 1986; Wilmott
1986). While Previts et al (1990, p.8) criticise narratives in accounting history because
they believe that of necessity narratives are incomplete in the story which they tell and
are therefore a 'weak form' of history, Guthrie and Parker (1991) have called for
accounting history researchers to reconsider the significant contributions which a
narrative form of history can provide to reconstructing the socio-political context of
accounting development. They argue that historical events cannot be understood as
solitary objects or unique historical artefacts but only as part of an ongoing temporal
process. Following Porter (1981), Guthrie and Parker (1991, p.5) state that the best
way to make sense of historical events is to examine the prior conditions from which
they arose through the use of the technique of the narrative.
At present both traditional and new accounting historians continue to find common
ground with the narrative form and its epistmological attributes. If, however, new
accounting history follows the path ofhistorians outside accounting and moves into the
realms ofpostmodernism then the narrative will no longer provide a source of common
ground for all accounting historians.
CONCLUSION AND A CALL FOR TOLERANCE
The days are long gone when one could refer to accounting history in some sort of
generic and all encompassing sense: there are now many directions which accounting
history can take in content, epistemology and methods. At the same time, enthusiasm
for the 'new' should be tempered with an appreciation for its antecedents. In the face
ofthe attractive newness and zealotry of the new accounting historians let us not allow
the deficiencies and relative myopia of the accounting history of the past blind us to its
value. Accounting historians of all persuasions should be open to alternative
interpretations and not accept that one method of inquiry and explanation is the only
source of insights and can disclose all the answers. Only by accepting the value of a
number of approaches can accounting historians go some way to ensuring that their
discipline does not retire into dogmatism and intradisciplinary intolerance.
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The "new" accounting history does not have to be at the complete expense of the
"old"; it does not have to be the old or the new, nor does the old have to be put on the
offensive of self justification for everything which it does or for which it stands.
Rather, all variations ofhistory can have a role to play: "the peasants ... (of history) are
as vital ... as its princes" (Elton 1982, p.80). The destructive alternative of impatient
iconoclasm will deny accounting history the opportunity to take the best from both the
new and the traditional. This is not an appeal that is blind to any deficiencies which
might be present in the old accounting history, or the new history, as this study has
demonstrated. Rather, it accepts that the new accounting history has much to offer but
that the extent of the bounty will be dependent on the foundations which have been
laid and continue to be provided by traditional modes of historical inquiry (Bryer 1991,
p.440). New accounting historians, according to Napier, will "wish to rely on the
traditionalists to generate much of the raw data for their theorising" (1989, p.247).
Accordingly, the writing of accounting history needs to be a collaborative effort. It
requires those whose primary focus is on the "what" and "how" of history which
verifies dates and the specifics of historical chronology, the traditional province of the
traditional accounting historians, and those whose overwhelming concerns are to
interrogate the historical record and ask "why" or "how did we get into this state?".
Accounting history is currently at a new cross road: it can decide to take the path of
the accounting discipline of the past which only leads to dissension and the generation
of negativity within the discipline or it can show the way to co-operation which will
provide the key to a greater historical and intellectual inheritance. If accounting
historians are to avoid internecine strife then they need to adopt a conciliatory stand
towards each other and to recognise the long term benefits that this will bring to the
discipline of accounting history. Acceptance by traditional accounting historians of the
merits of new accounting history should not be indicative of a loss of confidence and
doubts about the credibility of the products of the traditional accounting historians
(Miller, Hopper and Laughlin 1991), p.396). Already, unfortunately, the forces have
begun to form on each side of the barriers.
...
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